Symbolic thinking :: extending the dual representation issue beyond the model/room paradigm. by Macconnell, Amy Jean
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
2000
Symbolic thinking :: extending the dual
representation issue beyond the model/room
paradigm.
Amy Jean Macconnell
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Macconnell, Amy Jean, "Symbolic thinking :: extending the dual representation issue beyond the model/room paradigm." (2000).
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 2353.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/2353

SYMBOLIC THINKING:
EXTENDING THE DUAL REPRESENTATION ISSUE
BEYOND THE MODEL / ROOM PARADIGM
A Thesis Presented
by
AMY JEAN MACCONNELL
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
May 2000
Psychology
© Copyright by Amy Jean MacConnell 2000
All Rights Reserved
SYMBOLIC THINKING:
EXTENDING THE DUAL REPRESENTATION ISSUE
BEYOND THE MODEL / ROOM PARADIGM
A Thesis Presented
by
AMY JEAN MACCONNELL
Approved as to style and content by:
Marvin W. Daehler, Chair
[a«cvJVlvers^ Menib^rNaiiK:y y ,
Arnold Well, Member
Melinda A. Novak, Department Head
Psychology
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor, Marvin W. Daehler, for his guidance and
valuable contributions to this project, especially in developing the concept for the
research. I am grateful for his patience during the many revisions of the thesis and for
providing feedback with regard to my presentation style.
I would also like to thank my committee members, Nancy Myers and Arnold
Well, for their feedback and suggestions throughout this project, especially regarding the
statistical analyses ofthe data.
I want to thank the National Science Foundation for funding this study as part of
Grant BCS - 9907861, as well as the Department of Psychology, for funding travel
expenses, experimental materials, and participant compensation.
I am especially gratefiil to Pearlie Pitts, staff assistant at the Child Study Center,
for her great efforts in recruiting and scheduling all of the children for the study. Thanks
also to Marie Evans, who assisted in the experiment during the course of the study. I
could not have completed this project without their help.
Finally, I wish to express thanks to my family and Robert Mitravich for their
support throughout my Master's project, and for their continued encouragement during
my graduate school career.
IV
ABSTRACT
SYMBOLIC THINKING:
EXTENDING THE DUAL REPRESENTATION ISSUE
BEYOND THE MODEL / ROOM PARADIGM
MAY 2000
AMY JEAN MACCONNELL, B.S., VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Marvin W. Daehler
Dual representation is the ability to represent an object both as a concrete entity and as an
abstract symbol or representation for something else. This study investigated whether
young children would show evidence of dual representation in a setting other than the
model/room task, which is typically used in research on the development of symbolic
thinking. Thirty- and 36-month-old children were tested for their ability to transfer an
event demonstrated by the experimenter from a child-sized workbench to a scale-model
of the workbench, or vice-versa. Also, the standard search and retrieval response was
replaced with an imitative response to determine whether this change would facilitate
dual representation in young children. Half of the children were assigned to the location
condition, which consisted of observing as the experimenter selected and placed a tool in
a particular place on the workbench. The child then moved to the analogous workbench
and reproduced the selection and placement as a test trial. Finally, the child returned
to
the origmal workbench to reproduce the selection and placement originally
performed by
the experimenter. This served as a memory trial. The other half of the
children followed
the same procedure, except the event consisted of reproducing
an activity with the tool as
opposed to placing it somewhere on the workbench. The results revealed that children
performed significantly better on the memory trials than on the test trials, aUhough their
performance was lower than typically evidenced by young children in previous dual
representation studies. The age of the child did not affect performance, suggestmg that
36-month-old children had no more representational insight in the task than the younger
children. The condition to which the child was assigned did not affect performance.
Finally, girls performed significantly better than the boys. The fmdings of the study did
not replicate the fmdings of previous research in dual representation using the
model/room task. Significant changes in the methodology associated with the imitation
procedure may have contributed to this outcome. Further research is planned to
determine whether evidence of dual representation may be found in new settings.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCnON
One of the most interesting topics in cognitive development that is currently under
investigation is dual representation. Dual representation is the ability to represent an
object both as a concrete entity and as an abstract symbol or representation for something
else. For example, one may perceive a model train as both a toy to play with and as a
representation for an actual train. Judy DeLoache has done extensive work on the
development of representational insight and has consistently found the same results:
children 36 months and older are typically successful in maintaining a dual
representation, while children 30 months and younger are not (e.g., DeLoache, 1989a).
DeLoache normally uses a particular design to investigate this phenomenon, a room and a
small-scale model of that room. She may, for example, hide a larger doll behind a chair
in the room, and ask the child to find a similar but smaller doll in the same place in the
model. The 36-month-olds have little difficulty retrieving the doll in the model, yet the
30-month-olds do very poorly. Moreover, a similar level of performance is obtained
when a small doll is hidden in a model and the child is asked to find the larger doll in the
larger room. One of the questions addressed in this study was whether the dual
representation problem displayed by young children extended to representational
situations other than the model-room paradigm, where a clear distinction between
operating within a larger, traversable space and operating upon a smaller, surveyable
space could be made. That is, did the type of spatial array presented to young
children to
assess their representational capacities affect dual representation
performance? The other
question investigated in this study was whether the type of activity the
child engaged in
during the task affected his or her dual representation performance. In particular, was
dual representation facilitated by the child's engagmg in specific activities with an object
as opposed to watchmg and remembering where to locate an object?
Review ofDeLoache Research
In her model-room design, DeLoache arranges an existing room with several
pieces of furniture, which serve as hiding places for a toy animal. She then creates a
realistic, three-dimensional model of the room, approximately one-fourth the size of the
actual room or smaller. In the standard condition, the model and room have a high
degree of similarity with identical pieces of furniture, except for their size, placed in the
same locations in the two arrays. The model is located in a room separate from the larger
room so the child can not see the two spaces simultaneously. A diagram of the rooms is
shown in Figure 1 . The child is introduced to two toys, such as Snoopy dolls, which are
also identical except for their size. The experimenter explains that the big and little
Snoopy like to do the same thing. The child then sees the experimenter hide the big
Snoopy in the big room, for example, and the child is asked to fmd the little Snoopy in
the same location in the model. After fmding little Snoopy, the child is then asked to fmd
the larger one in the initial space in which he or she saw it being hidden; this serves as a
memory trial.
DeLoache consistently finds that 36-month-olds generally perform well, with at
least 75% errorless retrievals, yet 30-month-olds typically do not perform higher than
20% errorless retrievals when attempting to retrieve the doll in the analogous location
(DeLoache, 1995a). The poor performance of the 30-month-olds is not a memory
problem, for almost all of the children are able to find the toy they
saw hidden in the
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original space. DeLoache suggests that the children are failing to use the model-room
relation as a source of information to solve the problem. To be successful, the children
must perceive the model both as a concrete entity in which a doll is hidden, and as a
representation of the room to correctly locate the doll. The model is very salient as a
concrete object; it is three-dimensional, contains pieces of furniture, and things can be
hidden in it. The salience of the model as a concrete object, according to DeLoache,
makes it difficult for the young children to also perceive the model as a representation of
the room. Their performance thus reflects a deficit in the ability to process dual
representations.
To further investigate this issue, DeLoache (1991, 1995b) tried to make the model
less salient as a concrete object, thus making it easier for younger children to perceive it
as a representation of the room. In one study, she replaced the model-room with either a
color photograph of the model, or replaced the individual pieces of fiirniture with color
photographs ofthem. In both cases, the 30-month-olds had over 70% errorless retrieval.
In another study, described as the Shrinking Room study, 30-month-olds' performance
was again quite high (DeLoache, 1995b). As in the original model-room task, children
were shown a room with several pieces of fiirniture and saw a toy hidden within the
room. The children were then led to believe that the room "shrunk" so the space and toy
were now the size of the model in the original study. The children were then asked to
find the toy in the same, but shrunken, space. DeLoache reasoned that if the children
believed that the room actually shrunk, there would not be a separate concrete
representation of the model; the small room was the same space as the big room. She
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found thai this manipulation did, in fact, increase the success of the young children.
Del.oache argued that it did so by eliminating the need for dual representation.
DeI>oache and other researchers have conducted numerous other studies
investigating dual representation, involving the standard model-room task, and have
consistently found the same results: 36-month-olds tend to be successful, while the 30-
month-oldsarenot(DeLoache, 19K9a, 1989b, 1995a, 1995b; DcLoache, Kolstad, &
Anderson, 1991 ; Del>oache & Marzolf, 1995). These results support the hypothesis that
when young children must solve problems that require the use of dual representations,
they often have great difficulty.
Dual Representation in Other Paradigms
Most of the studies that have obtained evidence for the dual representation
hypothesis have used the model-room paradigm. However, one has been carried out
which involved the use of dolls to evoke dual representation in young children
(DeLoache & Marzolf, 1 995). The purpose of the study was to examine young children's
ability to use the doll as a means of remembering an event that the children had
experienced. It was motivated by the desire to investigate how efTectively young children
are able to employ anatomically detailed dolls which are often used in sexual abuse cases.
DeLoache did, however, stress the importance of being able to process dual
representations in this situation; children must realize not only that the object is a doll but
that the doll is a symbol for themselves. This realization is necessary for the doll to be a
valid indicator of possible abuse inllicted upon the child.
Part of the experiment involved children ages 2'/2, 3, and 4 years of age placing
stickers on the doll in the same places that the experimenter had placed
similar stickers
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on the children. For example, if the experimenter had placed a sticker on the child's
elbow, the child was expected to place a similar sticker on the doll's elbow. The IVz-
year-olds had 40% correct placement, the 3-year-olds had 70% correct placement, and the
4-year-olds had 90% correct placement. The results of the sticker placement task again
suggested that young children have trouble using salient concrete objects as
representations for other objects. However, the personal involvement required in this
study, such as having stickers placed on one's body, made it difficult for some children to
successfully complete the task. Other children refused to accept the doll as a symbol for
themselves. Thus, the unique aspects of this task may have made it difficult to
effectively determine what role inabilities associated with dual representation per se
played in performance. Nevertheless, 2V2-year-olds did somewhat better in this task than
on the standard model-room problem.
An important question, then, still remains as to whether limitations in the ability
to engage in dual representation extend to settings other than spatial tasks involving the
model-room relationship. In the standard model-room task, the child moves about, or
traverses, within the larger space in order to see all of the materials and to retrieve the
hidden object. In contrast, when presented with the model in the standard task, the child
is able to view or survey the entire array at once and, of course, does not move about
within it. Could this difference be an important factor in limiting dual representational
ability? The present study differs from the standard model-room experiments by
employing a child-sized workbench and a much smaller model of that workbench to
examine the dual representation hypothesis. By using the workbench and a
model of it to
test the dual representation hypothesis, the child was able to
survey the entire space in
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both the child-sized array and the model. Thus, all of the materials were immediately
visible in both arrays and the visual perspective or point-of-view remained constant in
order to solve the problem. The workbenches, then, permit a test of whether the
difficulty of dual representations found with the standard room and model setting stems
from having to operate both within a larger space and upon a smaller space.
Maintaining a Common Visual Perspective
In principle, the poor performance of the young children should extend to any
problem involving dual representations. On the other hand, if the difficulty is linked to
the child's perspective and kmd of activity that can be performed upon the two spatial
representations, then children might be expected to have far less difficulty in a task where
perspective and activity are similar than in the standard model-room task. DeLoache
(1995b) conducted one study that differed from the standard model-room task in that two
models, one twice as large as the other, were used. Thus, for both settings, the entire
space could be seen at once; the child could maintain the same perspective with both
spaces. DeLoache found that 30-month-old children tested in this condition were
successful 75% of the time. Perhaps children did not realize that the two arrays differed
or because their size was relatively similar, had no difficulty on the task. However, these
results also raise the possibility that keeping the visual point-of-view constant in both
settings eliminated their difficulty in employing a dual representation. Thus, a primary
goal of this study is to test whether young children's difficulty with dual representations
extends to arrays where a change in perspective associated with traversable and
surveyable space is eliminated, while keeping the model one-fourth the size of the room.
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Imitative Versus Retrieval Response
In the standard task, children demonstrate their understanding of the relationship
between the model and the room by retrieving a hidden object in the second space on the
basis of information provided in the first space. However, in the study proposed here
involving the workbench, children will be asked to demonstrate this knowledge by
carrying out an imitative response. DeLoache (1989a; DeLoache, Kolstad, and
Anderson, 1991) directly compared the relationship between retrieval and imitative
performance in the standard model-room task. After the child saw how the model and
room were similar as part ofthe initial orientation phase in the standard model-room task,
children in the imitative condition watched the experimenter place the Snoopy doll on a
piece of furniture in the room. Then, reminding the child that the big and little animals
liked to do the same thing, the experimenter asked the child to place the little animal in
the same location in the model. The researchers found that the imitative performance
was comparable to the retrieval performance. The 36-month-olds successfully imitated
the placement of the toy animal (75% correct), while the 30-month-olds did not (16%
correct). These results were nearly identical to the retrieval performance. This study,
then, indicated that the younger children could do no better when the task demanded an
imitative response rather than a retrieval response. The young children were not able to
process dual representations ofthe model irrespective ofwhich response was required.
In some ways, the finding that an imitative response is no easier than a retrieval
response is surprising. Although both depend on memory, the child has only the location
cue to guide recall when asked to retrieve the hidden object as part of the representational
task. However, in producing an imitative response, children have both the location cue
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and the doll available and need only reproduce the relationship between the two as part of
the representational task. In fact, in another study investigating a different issue
pertaining to the dual representation hypothesis, Schmitt (1997) directly compared
performance and found the imitation task to be somewhat easier than the retrieval task.
Schmitt asked 2-year-old children to either find a hidden toy in a room or to imitate the
experimenter's placement of the toy in the room after watching the experimenter hide or
position the toy through either a window or on a television. The children had
approximately 22% correct performance in the search task, yet had about 42% correct
performance in the imitation task when they viewed the activity via television.
Nevertheless, regardless of whether children had to retrieve the toy or to imitate its
placement, they did far poorer when provided the information through television than
when observing the experimenter through a window. In this latter condition, children
were successfiil in retrieving the toy or in imitating its placement in over 75% ofthe
trials. Thus, the dual representation demands associated with television yielded poorer
performance in both the retrieval and imitation tasks. Indeed, if difficulty in processing
dual representations is the primary factor limiting transfer, then performance should be
poor in tasks involving either imitation or retrieval.
If the dual representation hypothesis is correct, 30-month-old children in the
present study would have difficulty imitating the appropriate placement of the tool on the
transfer task. A second major goal of this study was to examine whether the type of
imitative response required in the task had some bearing on transfer. Would the children
have the same difficulty with dual representations when the imitative response involved a
specific activity associated with the appropriate tool? Or, did such an activity
serve to
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assist the child in recognizing the relationship between the child-size workbench and the
model? That is, did the physical action performed with the tools serve to mediate
conceptual understanding involving dual representations?
Evidence for Young Children's Imitation of Actions
A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the imitative capacities
of very young children. Infants as young as nine months are capable of imitating actions,
even after a 24-hour delay (Meltzoff, 1988). For example, the young infants were shown
an action with a novel toy, such as shaking a plastic egg that contained metal nuts to
make a rattling sound. The nine-month-olds were able to reproduce the actions both
immediately and after a 24-hour delay. Further research has found evidence of a
developmental trend in imitative ability. Barr, Dowden, and Hayne (1996) have found
that older infants require less exposure to the target activity. For example, 12-, 18-, and
24-month-old infants displayed deferred imitation after viewing the target behaviors three
times over a 30-second interval. Six-month-old infants, however, required twice the
amount of exposure to the target actions before they could successftilly imitate the
actions after a 24-hour delay. Other developmental changes that the researchers found
were that older infants are more accurate in their imitation, and they are capable of
carrying out multiple-step sequences of actions.
One noteworthy capability of older infants is the ability to show deferred
imitation across changes in object color and size, and also across changes in context.
Bamat, Klein, and Meltzoff (1996) investigated whether 14-month-old infants were
capable of such an ability. For example, children were presented with a miniature,
wooden dumbbell that could be pulled apart. In the test phase, they were presented
with
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a dumbbell of different colors about VA times larger than the miniature dumbbell, and
given time to imitate the same behavior seen by the experimenter. In the context-change
condition, children were presented with the objects in an orange polka-dot tent, and tested
in a plain, white laboratory room. They found strong evidence of imitation with changes
in the salient features of the objects and context changes. Children who had observed the
experimenter perform the activity displayed imitation far more frequently than children in
the control group, who had not seen the experimenter imitate the action.
Bamat et al. discuss the implications of these fmdings with respect to symbolic
thinking. Although the objects in the encoding and recall contexts may have differed in
color and size, the children were able to perceive enough of a resemblance between the
objects to transfer the imitation. The children were not simply repeating a familiar
behavior since they were not allowed the opportunity to practice the actions before the
test phase. The young children needed to maintain a representation of the activity they
observed in order to spontaneously recall the imitative response in the test phase with the
objects that had changed in size and color.
The imitative literature provides convincing evidence that very young infants are
capable of imitating actions performed by another individual. Why, then, do the 30-
month-old children in DeLoache's standard task show poor performance when imitating
the placement of a doll during the orientation phase? Certainly one explanation is in
terms of the difficulties associated with the ability to process dual representations.
The
imitative response in the model-room paradigm requires both a representation of
the two
arrays plus an understanding of their relationship to one another.
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In the standard model/room paradigm, the child must also complete the goal of
positioning the doll in a particular location in the analogous array. In contrast, children in
other imitative tasks are generally encouraged to reproduce a specific action, and the
actions are primarily linked to the objects in the arrays. This response may be far easier
to imitate than the placement of the doll in a particular, yet arbitrary, location in the
standard model/room task. The imitative task may also be more difficult for the younger
children because it is a spatial task. The doll does not cue where it should be placed. On
the other hand, the imitative procedures in studies by Meltzoff and others require the
child to imitate an activity with a toy that may be suggestive of a particular activity; there
are no spatial demands.
Imitation in the Present Study
In the current study involving the workbench, children in one condition were
asked to transfer a response that differed significantly from DeLoache's standard task;
children did not simply place an object in an arbitrary location, but imitated a specific
action with that object. By reducing the spatial demands, 30-month-old children may be
able to show greater evidence of dual representation. By observing whether a child was
able to select and reproduce a particular action with the analogous tool, rather than
selecting and placing that tool in a particular location on the workbench, we can answer
the second question posed. That is, whether the type of activity in which the child was
engaged affected dual representation task performance.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD SECTION
Subjects
Fifty-nine children participated in this study. Three additional children refused to
complete at least three of the four trials required to remain in the study and were dropped
from the analyses. Of the 59 children who completed the study, two completed only
three of the four trials due to experimenter error. Thirty 36-month-old children (34-38
months, M= 36.9 months), with 18 girls and 12 boys, and twenty-nine 30-month-old
children (29-31 months, M= 30.2 months), with 14 girls and 15 boys were included in
the final sample. Most children were Caucasian and middle class. Children were
recruited from state birth records, and all were tested at the Child Study Center in
Springfield, Massachusetts.
Materials
A plastic, child-sized, Fisher-Price workbench was used in this experiment, as
well as a scale model of the workbench. A sketch of the workbench is shown in Figure 2.
The child-sized workbench was approximately 24 inches wide and 36 inches high. The
workbench included a horizontal top shelf, 21 inches long and 8 inches deep, and a
horizontal workspace at the child's waist-level, 16 inches wide and 18 inches deep. The
surface ofthe horizontal workspace resembled a peg-board in which nails or screws
could be placed. Below the top shelf, approximately at the child's eye-level, were four
hooks for hanging various tools. A bucket, 91/2 inches wide and 5 inches deep, hung on
right side ofthe workbench at the level of the workspace. A net bag, AVi inches wide and
7% inches long, hung from the left side of the workspace.
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The tools and materials included as part of the workbench were a plastic hammer,
saw, screwdriver, wrench, screws, and a plastic block that resembled wood. The tools
were each approximately 5 inches long and 1 'A inches thick, and the screws were about 2
inches long. The four tools were placed on the workspace at the beginning of each trial,
ordered from left to right as follows: hammer, saw, screwdriver, wrench. A scale model
workbench was created to be as similar to the child-sized workbench as possible. The
model workbench and tools were made ofwood, and the components of the model were
painted the same color as the larger workbench and constructed so both workbenches and
tools were physically similar to one another except for size. The scale model of the
workbench and the small tools were % the size of the child-sized workbench. Two Ehno
puppets, identical except for their size, were also used. These puppets maintained the
same ratio in size as the child-size and scale model workbenches and tools. The child-
sized workbench and its model were located in two adjacent rooms so that both arrays
could not be seen simultaneously by the child during testing.
Procedure
In each age group, children were assigned to either a location condition or an
activity condition. These two conditions differed in the kind of event the child was asked
to reproduce in the analogous setting. In the location condition, the child observed as
Ehno selected and then placed a tool in a particular place on the workbench and was then
asked to show how the other Ehno would place the tool in a specific location on the
analogous workbench. In the activity condition, the child observed as Ehno selected and
then used the tool in a particular manner on the workbench and was then asked to show
how the other Ehno would use the tool on the analogous workbench. Children in both
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conditions first received an orientation to the materials. Following the orientation,
children received four test trials and four memory trials.
Orientation. In both conditions, each child received extensive instructions that
emphasized the similarities between the two puppets, the two workbenches, and the
analogous tools used in this study. Every effort was made to make the instructions
comparable to those used in the model/room tasks within the constraints of the
modifications needed to accommodate this particular task. To begin, the child was
brought into the room with the child-size workbench and the experimenter introduced the
two Ehno puppets, pointing out their similarities except for size. For example, "See little
Elmo? He looks just like big Elmo except that he is smaller." The experimenter then
explained how the two puppets liked to do the same things, and that they each have their
own workbench.
The experimenter then pointed out the similarities between the two workbenches
and their tools to the child. She began by saying, "This is big Ehno's tool bench. He has
all of these tools to help him build things." The experimenter then proceeded to illustrate
various features of the child-size workbench (e.g., the shelf, bucket, hooks, and bag) and
pointed out each of the tools to the child. After the child had become familiar with the
child-size workbench, the experimenter and child moved to the scale model of the
workbench located in the adjacent room. The experimenter said, "This is little Ehno's
workbench. He has all ofthese tools to also help him build things." Again, the
experimenter described the bench and its features and pointed out each of the tools to the
child. For example, the experimenter said, "See the little blue bucket on the side of this
workbench? It looks just like the blue bucket on the big bench. They look the same
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except that this one is smaller." The child saw how both workbenches contained a top
shelf, a bucket, hooks, and a net bag.
To complete the orientation, each of the small tools was compared to its larger
counterpart. The experimenter and child returned to the initial room, taking each of the
tools from the scale model workbench into the room and pointed out their similarity to
the larger tools. The experimenter selected one of the small tools and said, "See this little
hammer is just like the big hammer" as she held both of them before the child. "This is
little Elmo's hammer and this is big Elmo's hammer". This exchange was carried out
with each of the tools. To complete the orientation process, the child was again reminded
of the similarity between the two workbenches and the analogous tools. Finally, the
experimenter demonstrated the large Elmo puppet waving, and asked the child what little
Elmo would do, emphasizing that both big and little Elmo liked to do the same things. If
the child failed to reproduce a waving action, the experimenter explained that little Elmo
would like to wave as well. Once the orientation process was complete, the test and
memory trials began.
Test and Memory Trials
Following the orientation phase, children began a sequence of four experimental
trials. Each trial included a) a demonstration event by the experimenter showing the
puppet selecting and placing one of the four tools (hammer, saw, screwdriver, wrench) in
one of four locations on the tool bench (in the location condition) or selecting and using
the tool in a specific way (in the activity condition); b) a test of that event using the
materials in the analogous setting, and c) a test ofmemory for the original event. In the
experimental tasks, trials began for half of the children with the child-sized workbench
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and the test occurred using the model; for the other half of the children, trials began with
the model and the testmg occurred with the child-sized workbench. Four orders of
presentation of the actions or locations were created to ensure that each tool and
implementation would be used about equally often on each trial.
Location Condition. In this condition, the demonstration event on each of the four
trials consisted of selecting and placing a tool in a specific location. At the initial setting,
either the child-size workbench or the model, the experimenter began with the first of
four trials while using the puppet. The four distinct locations in which the tools were
placed were in the bucket, on the top shelf, hanging from a hook, and in the net bag. For
each trial, the experimenter used the puppet to select and place the tool in a particular
location while saying, "Watch where big Elmo is putting his tool." The experimenter did
not name the specific tool or location on the workbench during the demonstration. As a
reminder the child was told, "Remember where big Elmo put this. Little Elmo wants to
put his in the same place. Let's go help little Elmo put his tool in the same place".
In the test setting, the experimenter continued to encourage the child to replicate
the selection and placement of the tool. She asked, "Can you help little Elmo put his tool
where big Ehno put his?" If the child was unable to replicate the selection or placement
of the tool after a few attempts, the experimenter prompted the child, reminding him or
her that the puppets like to keep their tools in the same place. If the child was unable to
select or place the tool in the correct location after several attempts, the experimenter
showed him or her the correct location.
After the child completed the test trial in the analogous setting, the experimenter
and child returned to the original setting. A second experimenter had moved the tool
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from where it had been placed earlier to its original position on the workbench. The
experimenter then asked the child to show "where big Elmo put his tool" as a memory
trial. The experimenter continued this same procedure for the three remaining trials,
using a different tool and location on each trial.
Activity Condition. In this condition, the demonstration event on each of the four
trials consisted of selecting and using a tool in a specific manner. At the initial setting,
either the child-sized workbench or the model, the experimenter began with the first of
four trials of selecting one of the tools and performing a distinct tool-appropriate action
with it. The four actions were hammering, sawing, twisting the screwdriver, and turning
the wrench. The expermienter performed the action using the puppet, while saying,
"Watch what big Elmo is doing." The experimenter did not name the specific action or
tool (i.e., "hammering", "sawing") while demonstrating the activity to the child. The
child was reminded "Remember what big Ehno does with this. Little Ehno wants to do
the same thing with his. Let's go help little Elmo do the same thing".
At the test setting, the experimenter encouraged the child to reproduce the same
action by asking, "Can you help little Ehno do the same thing that big Ehno did?" Again,
if the child did not select the correct tool or replicate the activity after several attempts,
the experimenter prompted the child, reminding him or her that the puppets like to do the
same things. If the child was still unable to select the correct tool or produce the same
action, the experimenter showed the child the correct action with the appropriate tool.
After the action had been performed in the analogous setting, the experimenter
and child returned to the original setting where the tool selection and action were first
demonstrated by the experimenter. The tools had again been replaced to their original
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position by the second experimenter. The experimenter then asked the child to reproduce
the tool selection and action with the puppet by asking "Can you show me what big Ehno
did?" This served as a memory trial for the original tool and action. The experimenter
continued this procedure for the three remaming trials, using a different tool and activity
on each trial.
Scoring
Each child received four test trials and four memory trials, although the three
children who completed only three trials were retained in the study. Each test trial
consisted of selecting the appropriate tool (tool selection), and placing or using the tool
correctly (tool implementation) in the analogous space. Each memory trial consisted of
tool selection and tool implementation in the retrieval space. Therefore, each child who
completed the task had four selection scores and four hnplementation scores for the test
trials, and four selection scores and four implementation scores for the memory trials.
Each child thus had a total test trial score of zero to four, and a total memory trial score of
zero to four. Because some children completed only three trials, proportion scores were
calculated for the participants, reflecting the proportion of correct responses out of the
total responses made. Analyses were run on these proportion scores.
Two dependent measures were available to determine whether transfer took place,
tool selection and tool implementation. These measures were not combined
because the
action performed in the activity condition may not have been independent
of the tool
selected. For both the test and memory trials, a correct response
was recorded if the child
correctly selected the appropriate tool and if he or she
reproduced the action or placement
on the first attempt. If the child's only response
was verbalizing, pointing to, or touching
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a tool for selection, that response was also scored as correct or incorrect. Verbalizations
and pointing were also considered as responses for tool implementation if the child could
communicate an appropriate response. If a child gave no response, it was scored as
incorrect. Although the child was encouraged to continue the task when the first attempt
was incorrect, only the first response was scored. However, each child was praised for
completing each trial regardless of whether his or her response was correct. If the child's
response was incorrect, the correct response was demonstrated before returning to the
original workbench.
19
CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses were run on order of presentation of the tools over trials,
initial setting, and gender to determine whether these factors were related to performance
and whether they could be excluded from further consideration in the analyses of the
data. A 4 (order of presentation) x 2 (type of trial: test versus memory) Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on type of trial was run on the proportion of
correct responses on tool selection. The effect of order of presentation was not
significant. There was a main effect oftype of trial, that is, whether the tool selection
took place at the analogous space (test trial, M= .389) or at the retrieval space (memory
trial, M = .509), F(l, 55) = 8.240, p < .005. The effect oftype of trial is one of the
prim£iry variables of interest, and will be further examined in the main analyses. A 4
(order of presentation) x 2 (type of trial) ANOVA was also run on tool implementation.
Again, order of presentation was not significant. The effect of type of trial was again
significant, with poorer performance on the test trial (M= .453), than on the memory trial
(M= .557) F(l, 55) = 6.701,/? < .012. Since the order of the presentation of the tools did
not affect children's performance, the order variable was dropped from frirther
consideration of the data.
A second variable of interest was the initial setting, that is, whether the child
began the test trials at the large workbench or at the model of the workbench. Individual
ANOVAs were performed on each dependent measure: tool selection on the test trial,
tool implementation on the test trial, tool selection on the memory trial,
and tool
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implementation on the memory trial. A significant effect was found on only one
measure, tool implementation on the test trial. Children displayed higher performance
when test trials took place with the child-sized workbench (M= .551) than with the scale
model {M=
.358), F(l, 57) = 6.124,/? < .016. The initial setting did not show a
significant effect on any of the other three measures. Since previous research in this area
has shown that the initial setting in which the child begins the test trials does not affect
performance, and its effect in the present study was only significant on one of the four
measures, the variable was also dropped from further consideration.
Finally, gender was examined. A gender difference was found on all four
dependent measures, with the girls performing better than the boys in every case. Gender
was significant on tool selection on the test trials, F(l, 57) = 4.194,/? < .045; marginally
significant on tool implementation on the test trials, F{\, 57) = 3.662,/? < .061;
significant on tool selection on the memory trials, F(l, 57) = 4.967, p < .030; and
significant on tool implementation on the memory trials, F(l , 57) = 7.656, /? < .008.
Gender was retained in subsequent analyses for further examination of its effects and
possible interactions with the main variables of interest in this study.
Main Analvses
Of primary interest in the present study was the performance of the participants
on the test and memory trials as a function of age and condition. As indicated above,
gender was also included as a factor because of the significant gender effects in the
preliminary analyses. The results for children's performance on tool selection is
considered first, followed by an examination of tool implementation.
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Tool Selection. Table 1 presents the proportion of correct tool selections, grouped
by type of trial, age, sex, and condition. As can be seen in the table, an overall higher
level of performance occurred on the memory trials than on the test trials. However, this
pattern was not found for all groups. For example, 36-month-olds in the activity
condition produced a higher proportion of correct responses on the test trials than on the
memory trials. As the preliminary analysis involving gender would suggest, the data also
indicate that the girls have a higher proportion of correct responses than the boys.
However, this pattern was not observed in all groups either. In particular, the 30-month-
old girls m the activity condition displayed somewhat lower proportions of correct
responses than the boys on both the test and memory trials. Finally, the general
performance of the children appeared rather low. One-sample t-tests with Bonferroni
adjustments were run on the tool selection measures to determine whether the children's
performance was significantly above chance (.25). Most of the scores that were above
chance were from the 36-month-old girls and on the memory trials. The proportion
scores that are higher than chance are indicated in Table I
.
A 2 (age) x 2 (sex) x 2 (condition) x 2 (type of trial) ANOVA with repeated
measures on type of trial was run on these data. The effect of type of trial was
significant, as was indicated in the preliminary analyses. Children performed better on
the memory trials than on the test trials, F(l , 5 1) = 7.995, p < .007. The main effect of
sex was also significant, F(l, 51) = 7.612,/? < .008, with girls having a higher level of
performance {M= .478 and .569 on test and memory trials, respectively) than the boys
{M= .301 and .441 on the test and memory trials, respectively). Age was not a
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significant factor on the selection measure, nor was the effect of condition. A three-way
interaction of age, condition, and type of trial was significant, F(l, 51) = 8.305,
p < .006. This interaction appears to stem from the poorer performance of the 36-month-
olds' on the memory trials than on the test trials in the activity condition. In contrast, the
children in the location condition performed better on the memory trials than on the test
trials. The 30-month-old children performed better on the memory trials than on the test
trials in both the activity and location conditions. Figure 3 illustrates the interaction.
Tool Implementation. Table 2 presents the proportion of correct tool
implementations as a function of type of trial, age, sex, and condition. As was found for
tool selection, higher proportions of correct responses occurred on the memory trials than
on the test trials, again with the exception of the 36-month-olds in the activity condition.
Table 2 also reveals that the females performed better than the boys, except for the 30-
month-old girls in the activity condition. The overall low proportion scores of the
children suggested that some ofthe scores might not be above chance. One-sample t-
tests with Bonferroni adjustments were run on the tool implementation mccisures to
determine which proportion scores were significantly higher than chance (.25). The
scores that were significantly higher than chance occurred mostly for the 36-month-old
girls and on the memory trials; these scores are indicated in Table 2.
A 2 (age) x 2 (sex) x 2 (condition) x 2 (type of trial) ANOVA was run on these
data, with repeated measures on type of trial. Again, the effect oftype of trial was
significant, F(l, 51) = 5.631,/? < .021, with superior performance on the memory trials
than on the test trials. The main effect of sex was also significant, F(l, 51) = 9.556,
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p < .003, with girls {M= .535 and .636 on test and memory trials, respectively)
performing better than the boys (M = .369 and .462 on test and memory trials,
respectively). As was the case for tool selection, neither the main effect of age nor the
effect of condition was significant for tool implementation. There was, however, a
significant two-way interaction of sex and condition, /^(l, 51) = 4.918,/? < .031. The
interaction stems largely from the superior performance of the girls compared to the boys
in the location condition, whereas the difference in performance for the activity condition
was not as substantial. Figure 4 illustrates this interaction.
The results from the analyses of children's tool selection and tool implementation
show similar patterns. For both the selection and implementation measures, superior
performance was seen on the memory trials. Girls outperformed boys on both measures,
whereas the two age groups did not differ in performance, which was similar in both
conditions. The consistent pattern found with these two measures suggests that selection
ofthe appropriate tool and the necessary implementation carried out by the child with
that tool provided similar information. Two Pearson product-moment correlations were
run, one for tool selection and tool implementation on the test trials, and one for tool
selection and tool implementation on the memory trials. The two measures were highly
correlated on test trials, r = .786, and on memory trials, r = .759, again suggesting that the
analyses of tool selection and tool implementation appear to be providing similar patterns
ofperformance.
Additional Analvses
Trials Effects. Previous research on symbolic development investigating test and
memory performance using a room and a model of the room has sometimes revealed trial
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effects. In some studies, children have been observed to perform better on the first test
trial than on any of the three remaining trials (O'Sullivan, Mitchell, 8c Daehler, 1999a,
1999b; Schmitt, 1997). Performance on each of the four trials was examined in the
present study to explore whether trial effects were present. Separate Cochran Q Tests
were carried out on the test and memory trials for both the tool selection and the tool
implementation measures to determine whether these differences were significant. When
collapsed over age, sex, and condition, the only significant trials effect was on tool
selection on the memory trial, g(3) = 13.067, p < .005. The proportion of correct tool
selections on memory trials collapsing over age, sex, and condition, for trials one through
four, can be seen in Figure 5. This figure shows that children performed better on the
first trial than on any of the other three trials. More specifically, children were better at
remembering which tool had been used by the experimenter on the first trial than on the
three subsequent trials. However further inspection of the data suggested that this finding
may not extend to both age groups. To further investigate the effect, separate Cochran Q
Tests were carried out for each age group. The effect of trials was pronounced in the 2/4-
year-old group, ^3) = 17.903,/? < .001, yet only marginal in the 3-year-old group, Q{3)
= 7.283, /7 < .10. The trial on which performance was superior was not consistent,
however, for the 2V2- and 3-year-olds, as can be seen in Figure 6. The 3-year-olds
showed better performance on the first trial than on any other; the 2 '/2-year-olds showed
the highest level of performance on the third trial, although they also did relatively well
on the first trial compared to trials two and four.
Since memory performance was generally better on the first trial than on any
other, test and memory performance on the first trial was further examined. First trial
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performance is uncontaminated by potential interfering factors from preceding trials,
such as memories of a previously correct response. Thus first trial data may provide the
clearest account of what factors are contributing to the children's performance. Likewise,
since memory performance was generally superior on the first trial, this data may also
provide the best opportunity to determine whether transfer occurred. For tool selection,
trial 1 data revealed a higher proportion of children (.69) correctly responding on the first
memory trial than on trial 2 (.37), trial 3 (.56), and trial 4 (.42). Nevertheless, test trial
performance on trial 1 (.40 correctly responded) appeared to be comparable to the test
trial performance on the three remaining trials, .40, .37, .37, respectively.
The first trial data were fiirther examined by the age of the participants, to
determine whether an age effect exists. Table 3 displays the proportion of correct
responses as a fiinction oftype of trial, type of response (selection versus
implementation), and age. When the scores on trial I are analyzed by age of the
participants, the proportion of 2V2-year-olds who correctly responded on the test and
memory trials (.38, .66, respectively) was similar to the proportion of 3-year-olds who
correctly responded on test and memory trials (.43, .72, respectively). A 2 (age) x 2 (type
of trial) ANOVA with repeated measures on type of trial confirmed that the effect of age
was not significant for tool selection on trial 1 . This finding provides convincing
evidence that even with optimal memory for the tool selection, there is no developmental
trend in performance for either the test or the memory trials.
For tool unplementation, the proportion of children correctly responding on the
first memory trial (.67) was again higher than the proportion of correct responses on
memory trials 2 (.46), 3 (.60), and 4 (.51). On test trials, performance on trial I (.52) was
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slightly higher than performance on the three remaining test trials,
.45, .41, .44,
respectively. When the data Irom trial 1 are analyzed hy age (see Table 3), both age
groups evidenced similar scores on the lirst memory trial; .66 of the younger children
correctly responded, and .69 of the older children correctly responded. However, some
evidence for a developmental trend is found for performance on the test trial. I'he
proportion o I' 2 '/2-year-olds who correctly responded on the first test trial is
.38, whereas
.67 of the 3-year-olds correctly responded. A 2 (age) x 2 (type of trial) with repeated
measures on type of trial was performed to determine whether there was an age elTect.
The analysis revealed that the effect of age was not significant. Although not significant,
the superior performance of the 3-year-olds on the first test trial of tool implementation is
more in accord with previous research in dual representation. I hat is, even when
memory demands are equally well met, the older children perform better than the
younger children on the test trials, perhaps rellecting more representational insight.
Test Performance of Children with High Memory Scores. The children in the
present .study must remember the event demonstrated by the experimenter in order for
transfer to occur. Many children, however, displayed low scores on the memory trials.
The test scores of children who performed well on the memory trials may provide more
evidence of transfer than test scores of children who had lower memory scores. (Children
who correctly responded on at least three out of the four memory trials were selected for
further examination, and their performance on the test trials was investigated. I'or tool
selection, I K of the 59 children correctly responded on at least three of the four memory
trials. Of these children, seven were 3()-month-oIds, who.se mean proportion of correct
responses on the test trials was .46. The mean proportion of correct responses of the
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eleven 36-month-olds was .52. There appears to be no convincing evidence of a
developmental trend in test performance for tool selection among high memory
performers.
The same investigation was conducted for tool implementation, again only for the
children who correctly responded on the memory trials 75% of the time. Twenty-five of
the 59 children had high scores on the memory trials. Of these children, eleven were 30-
month-olds, whose mean proportion of correct responses on the test trials was .50.
Fourteen of the children were 36-month-olds, and their mean proportion of correct
responses was .66. The older children performed better than the younger children on tool
implementation, even when both age groups had high memory scores. This finding is in
agreement with DeLoache's research, where both 30- and 36-month-old children perform
well on memory trials, and the 36-month-olds display more evidence of transfer on the
test trials than the 30-month-olds.
Performance of Children with Workbenches at Home. Some participants may
have had substantial experience with child-sized workbenches, especially if one was
available in their home. Thus, during debriefing, parents were asked whether their
children had a similar toy at home or whether their child played with one in school or
daycare. The performance of children who had experience with workbenches was
compared to the performance of children who did not have workbench experience. Only
18 of the 59 children who participated in this study had experience with workbenches
(30%). A 2 (experience) x 2 (type of trial) ANOVA was run, comparing the performance
of children with workbenches to those without. On tool selection, the performance of
children with workbenches {M= .306 and .431 on the test and memory trials,
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respectively) did not differ significantly from the performance of children without
workbenches (M= .427 and .545 on the test and memory trials, respectively), although
children without workbenches yielded slightly higher mean proportion scores than
children with workbenches. Tool implementation, on the other hand, was affected by
whether the children had workbenches (M= .319 and .463 on the test and memory trials,
respectively) or did not have workbenches, (M= .512 and .600 on the test and memory
trials, respectively), F(l, 57) = 6.688,/? < .012. The children without workbenches
performed significantly better than the children with workbenches.
Because of the main effect of gender, a 2 (experience) x 2 (type of trial) ANOVA
was carried out separately for girls and boys to determine whether the superior
performance of the children without workbench experience was mediated by gender.
Seven of the girls and eleven of the boys had previous workbench experience. Gender
was not a significant factor on tool selection; availability of a workbench did not lead to
significantly better performance for either boys or girls on the test or memory trials.
However, for tool implementation, having experience with a workbench significantly
affected performance for boys, F(l, 25) = 8.132,/? < .008, with superior performance
evidenced by the boys without previous workbench experience. The mean proportion of
correct responses on the test trials by boys without experience was .45, whereas the
proportion of correct responses by boys with experience was only .25. For the memory
trials, the proportion of correct responses of boys without and with workbench
experience, respectively, was .54 and .35. The effect of workbench experience on tool
implementation was not found for the girls. The significant effect of workbench
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experience is thus limited to the boys, although for both groups previous workbench
experience hindered performance.
Perseverative F.rrnrs
Further examination of the data was carried out to investigate the types of errors
made by the children. Previous research on dual representation tasks has shown that
young children often make perseverative errors (DeLoache, 1999; O'SulHvan, Mitchell,
& Daehler, 1999a, 1999b; Schmitt, 1997). Perseverative errors in this study are those in
which the child responded by selecting and implementing the tool that had been correct
on the immediately preceding test and memory trial. For example, if the hammer had
been the correct tool to select on trial 1 of the test trials, and the child chose the hammer
again on trial 2 of the test trials, the error would be counted as a perseverative error.
Similarly, if placing the hammer on the shelfwas the correct implementation on trial 1 of
the memory trials, and the child repeated this implementation response on trial 2 of the
memory trials, the error would be counted as a perseverative error. To examine
perseverative errors, the data were collapsed across age, sex, and condition.
For tool selection on the test trials, 40 ofthe 144 errors (27%) consisted of
perseverative errors. For tool selection on the memory trial 44 of the 1 16 errors (37%)
were perseverative. For tool implementation on the test trial, a total of 39 perseverative
errors were made out of 128 errors (30%). Finally, for tool implementation on the
memory trial, children made 39 perseverative errors out of 105 errors (37%). Some
children made more errors than others, and thus could also have made more perseverative
errors. As a consequence, a proportion score was calculated for each child reflecting the
number ofperseverative errors committed out of the total numbers of errors made. The
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mean proportion of perseverative errors out of total errors was .285 for tool selection on
the test trial,
.399 for tool selection on the memory trial, .321 for tool implementation on
the test trial, and .396 for tool implementation on the memory trial. One-sample t-tests
were run on each of these four measures to determine whether children produced
perseverative errors at a level higher than chance (.33). On all four measures, the rate of
perseverative errors did not differ significantly from chance.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The major findings from the study indicate that the children performed better on
the memory trials than on the test trials, as had been expected. Both 30- and 36-month-
olds performed at similar levels on memory trials, as expected, but performance of both
age groups was substantially below the level anticipated. Children's performance on the
memory trials was expected to approximate the performance of young children in
previous research on dual representation, yet the children in the present study fell below
that expectation. In addition, neither 30- nor 36-month-olds performed well on the test
trials, suggesting that even the 36-month-old children lacked the representational insight
required for this task. Similarly, performance levels were quite equivalent in the location
and activity conditions. This finding indicates that both transfer and memory were
relatively similar whether the child was required to place the tool in a particular location
or imitate an activity with the tool. Finally, superior performance was evidenced by the
girls compared to the boys.
The results of the present study can perhaps be best understood in terms of the
differences between this study and the research previously conducted in the field of dual
representation. FoUowmg a summary of the differences in results, possible reasons for
why the study revealed different findings, with emphasis on the methodological
differences between the present study and the standard model/room paradigm, will be
discussed. Fmally, conclusions and the future directions of research in dual
representation are considered.
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Differences in Current and Previous Research Findings
The results of the present study, specifically the test and memory trial
performance, were quite different from the fmdings of previous research on dual
representation which has been carried out using a room and a model of the room (e.g.,
DeLoache, 1989a, 1989b, 1999; O'Sullivan et al., 1999a, 1999b). Four main differences
between the results obtained in the present study and those involving transfer between the
model and room stand out. First, the present study found a far lower level of
performance on memory trials for both 30- and 36-month-olds in both the location and
activity conditions than is typically found in the standard DeLoache paradigm. In the
model/room studies, 30- and 36-month-old children typically perform quite well on the
memory trials, usually recalling well over 70% of the locations in which an object had
been hidden. In the present study, both age groups showed a much lower level of
performance on memory trials; the highest proportion of correct responses was 70%,
which only occurred for the 36-month-old girls. Thus it is possible that this task may
indeed have been a more difficult one for very young children.
A second fmding in the present study that differed from previous research was the
absence of an age effect on the test trials. Children of both ages showed comparable
performance on the test and memory trials. Most previous research has shown that 36-
month-olds perform significantly better than 30-month-olds on the test trials, indicating
that the older children have achieved a higher level of representational insight
than the
younger children. That fmding was not evidenced here. However,
36-month-olds do not
always perform better than 30-month-olds; other studies have revealed
36-month-old
children can have difficulty in dual representation tasks. For example,
DeLoache et al.
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(1991) varied the similarity of the materials in one experiment; the ftimiture in the model
and room differed m color and/or pattern. The 36-month-old children's performance was
hindered with these changes. DeLoache (1989a) also showed that 36-month-old
children's performance may be affected if they do not receive the extensive orientation
phase, during which the correspondence between the model and the large room is
explained. It is possible that the effort to maintain similarity between the child-sized
workbench and the model of the workbench was not successful. This explanation,
although possible, seems unlikely given the poor performance of the older children even
on the memory trials. Since memory was apparently limited, the opportunity for transfer
was thus limited as well.
The present study also found girls performing better than the boys. Gender
differences have not been evidenced m previous dual representation research, nor have
gender differences been consistently reported in the imitation literature (Bauer &
Hertsgaard, 1993; Bauer & Mandler, 1989; Hanna & Meltzoff, 1993; Marzolf&
DeLoache, 1994; Meltzoff, 1985). However, in the present study, the gender difference
was reliable, occurring on each of the four dependent measures. The reason for a
difference in performance between the boys and the girls is not obvious. One might have
expected boys to outperform the girls, given that the materials used in the study were
tools and a workbench, a toy perhaps of greater interest to young boys than to young
girls. Ifboys have greater interest in such materials, then they might have gained
somewhat greater exposure to the workbenches and tools even if they did not have these
materials at home or in a day care center they attended. When workbenches were readily
available to them, the familiarity appeared to interfere with performance, which could
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explain why the boys did not perform as well as the girls. Also, the boys may have not
performed as well as the girls in this study simply due to a greater impulsivity to engage
in the activities associated with the workbenches. If they were preoccupied with the
materials before the orientation began, the boys may not have attended to the instructions
of the task. Unfortunately, no measure of how quickly participants engaged in tool
selection was obtained in this study.
Finally, the children in the present study displayed a lower rate of perseverative
errors than in previous research. The rate of perseverative errors in this study did not
differ significantly from chance, whereas previous research has shown a rate of
perseverative errors as high as 60% (O'SuUivan et al., 1999a, 1999b; Schmitt, 1997).
Possible Reasons for Different Findings
Why did the results of the present study look so different from the findings of
previous dual representation studies? The present study introduced several
methodological changes that could have contributed to the differences between the
present results and the results typically found in this area of research. A primary goal of
the present study was to examine whether difficulty in transfer in the standard
model/room task is a consequence oftwo different types of spaces, one traversable and
one surveyable. DeLoache (1995b) conducted a study in which the model and room
maintained a 2:1 size ratio, and both spaces were surveyable, thus maintaining a similar
visual perspective. The 30-month-old children's performance on the test trials was better
in that condition (75% correct) than in the standard model/room condition. The present
study used a completely different type of array, a workbench and a model of the
workbench, in order to eliminate the change of perspective inherent in the model/room
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task. It was hypothesized that maintaining a consistent perspective would aid the
children in the task. However, that was not the case. It is possible that the low level of
performance found in the present study indicates that young children may simply not be
able to perform well in a task involving materials such as the workbench. The
workbench may have been too attractive and interesting to the children, and provided
many opportunities for manipulation. However, other methodological changes may have
contributed to the lower performance and need to be considered as well.
A second change introduced in the present study that differs from the standard
model/room task is that the child was asked to imitate a placement or an action with
materials as opposed to searching for a hidden object. The decision to use an imitation
procedure was based on the assumption that it was comparable in difficulty to a retrieval
response. DeLoache's research indicates that imitative responses and retrieval responses
yield similar results (DeLoache et al., 1991). On the other hand, research by Schmitt
(1997) showed evidence that imitative tasks were easier than search tasks for young
children. Based on these findings, the children were expected to execute the imitation
procedure as well as, if not better than, the children in the model/room task. The data in
the present study did not support this hypothesis. Thus the change to an imitation
procedure alone is unlikely to account for the low level of performance of the children in
the present study.
Another potential, and perhaps more critical, basis for the different findings in the
present study is that the child was required to remember two steps: which tool to select
from among the four possible choices; and which implementation response to reproduce
with that tool. In order to be successful in the model/room task, children only need to
36
search for a single hidden object. For example, when the child is asked to imitate the
placement of the object in these tasks (DeLoache et al, 1991
; Schmitt, 1997), the child is
given the one object for placement. However, in the present study, the child had to
remember which tool to select and then to pick out that tool from among the four choices
before engaging in the placement or activity component of his or her response. Selecting
from among four alternatives could be far more difficult for the children than had been
expected.
Previous research on imitation of event sequences has shown that young children,
even children much younger than those tested here, are capable ofremembering both
familiar and novel event sequences for immediate and deferred recall. For example, a
familiar event sequence may consist of placing a toy bear in a tub and washing it with a
cloth. A novel sequence may consist of pulling a mitten off of a puppet, shaking the
mitten to hear a bell inside, and replacing the mitten on the puppet (Barr et al., 1996).
Bauer and Hertsgaard (1993) found that both \3V2- and 1672-month-old infants were able
to recall two-act sequences immediately and after a one-week delay. Given these
findings, the low performance of the children on the memory trials in the present study
may seem surprising. However, the imitative responses of the infants did not require
them to select from among several objects before executing the imitative response. The
object necessary for the imitation was presented to the infant, and they only needed to
remember the appropriate action to display with that object. However, the present study
required the child to select the appropriate tool from among four choices before executing
the imitative response, a seemingly more difficult task than those performed by infants
in
other imitation studies. Also, most imitative studies with very young children
only
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presented the child with one set of actions to imitate; the child was not required to select
among alternative actions to imitate. Since the present study consisted of four trials, the
children needed to inhibit selections and responses carried out on previous trials in order
to make the correct selection and response on the current trial. The difficulty in
inhibiting previous responses may also explain the superior performance of the children
on the first memory trial of tool selection.
The present study also differed from previous research in that the Elmo puppet
was used as the instigator of action, whereas in the model/room paradigm, the toy serves
as the actual target of search. The child needed to observe as the puppet demonstrated
the event, and thus needed to identify with the puppet on some level in reproducing the
action both on the test and memory trials. At the present time, the increased processing
demands that may be required to identify with the toy, and the consequences for
performance, are unknown. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most children immediately
recognized the puppet as a common television character and were content to engage in
the task with Ehno. Nevertheless, this change in the procedure could have affected
performance.
One interesting fmding of the present study is that the children who did not have
previous experience with workbenches performed better than the children who did have
previous experience. Although one may predict that practice with a workbench could
engage the child's attention to the task and increase performance, it appears that
experience with the materials impeded the child's ability to perceive the symbol-referent
relationship. DeLoache (1999) states that children without experience with
experimental
materials are better able to achieve psychological distance from the
materials, enabling
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them to recognize the correspondence between the larger and scale model spaces. She
found, for example, that children who were allowed to play with the experimental
materials before the task did not perform as well as the children who did not play with the
materials. The poorer performance of children with workbench experience may also
explain why the boys did not perform as well as the girls in this study. Their greater
interest in the materials may have hindered their ability to recognize the relationship
between the two spaces.
Conclusions and Future Directions
The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the dual
representation phenomenon existed outside of the model/room context by making two
primary changes: first, using a procedure consisting of imitative responses from the child,
and second, creating a new context in which to investigate transfer. The imitative
procedures incorporated one oftwo types of conditions, a location condition and an
activity condition. The location condition, which required the child to place a tool in a
particular place on the workbench, most closely resembles the standard model/room
procedure. The child needed to remember the spatial location of the tool on the first
workbench, and then to transfer that information to the second workbench to reproduce
the spatial placement. Similarly, in DeLoache's standard procedure, the child must
remember the spatial location of the toy being hidden in order to correctly fmd the toy on
the test trials.
The activity condition did not impose the same spatial demands on the child. The
task consisted of selecting one of the four tools and imitating a behavior with it and
thus
did not impose the same spatial demands, although imitation was still required.
Despite
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the differences in the demands of the two conditions, no significant effect on performance
was found. Activity demands did not lead to more successful imitation than spatial
demands. The imitative response required in this task was more difficult for the children
than imitative responses required in previous research. Again, the difficulty may stem
from the fact that the child was first required to select the appropriate tool before an
implementation response could be given.
Despite the lack of age differences over four trials, one of the most interesting
findings from the present study was the presence of an age effect when examining the
first trial data. The performance of the 30- and 36-month-old children on the first
memory trial closely resembles the memory performance of young children in previous
dual representation research. Both age groups remembered the event they had observed
in the original setting. No age differences were found in tool selection on the first test
trial, suggesting that transferring which tool to select was equally difficult for the 30- and
36-month-old children. However, the older children displayed superior tool
implementation compared to the 30-month-olds on the first test trial. The older children
thus displayed the ability to transfer information from one workbench to the other,
displaying more representational insight than the 30-month-old children. The finding
provides some support for the hypotheses of previous research, claiming that the ability
to represent an object as both an object and as a symbol develops around 36-months of
age.
Some evidence of a developmental trend in test performance was also found when
examining the performance of children who scored well on the memory trials. When the
children remembered the event that had been demonstrated, both age groups displayed
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similar tool selection performance on test trials. However, the 36-month-old children
displayed superior transfer of tool implementation on the test trials. Even when both 30-
and 36-month-old children remembered the event, the older children demonstrated more
representational insight in transferring where to place the tool or what activity to perform
with the tool.
The results of the present study do not provide a clear answer as to whether the
different results obtained are due to the different type of space utilized (workbench versus
room) or due to the type of activity required by the child to complete the task (imitation
versus search). Additional research is planned in which the same type of space, a
workbench, will be utilized, but the same activity as used in previous studies, search and
retrieval, will also be used. This design should shed light on whether the different type of
space is the basis for the different results. Specifically, four hiding places will be created
on the workbench, and a similar procedure to DeLoache's search task will be employed.
The child will observe as the experimenter hides a tool on the workbench, and will then
move to the model of the workbench to fmd a similar tool that has been hidden in the
analogous place. The child will return to the first workbench and retrieve the tool the
child had seen hidden by the experimenter.
Dual representation is required in the model/room paradigm. However, it is not
clear whether the phenomenon will be evidenced in new settings. The type of setting in
which dual representation is studied may have important consequences for the age and
extent to which it is displayed. Extending the investigations of the development of
representational insight to new settings should provide more information about the nature
and limits of this developmental phenomenon.
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Table 1.
Proportion of Tools Correctly Selected as a Function of
Type of Trial, Age, Sex, and Condition
Age Sex N Location Condition N Activity Condition
1 esi Memory Test Memory
30 months Males 8 710
.J ij 7 .357
.536
(.08) (.10) (.09)
Females 5 9 .2/0 .528
(.12) (.10) (.09) (.08)
36 months Males 5 .200 .500 7 .429 .357
(.12) (.10) (.10) (.09)
Females 10 .400 .608** 8 .687** .594*
(.08) (.07) (.09) (.08)
Means .342 .508 .437 .503
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors.
* = significantly above chance at /? < .05
** = significantly above chance atp < .01
*** = significantly above chance atp < .001
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Table 2.
Proportion of Correct Tool Implementations as a Function of
Type of Trial, Age, Sex, and Condition
A OP <SPYOCX \T1\ Location Condition Activity Condition
Test Memory Test IVIpmnrv
j\j monms Males o8 .250 .416 7 .393 .607
(.09) (.08) (.10) ( 08^
remales 5 .600 .650* 9 .250 .500
(.12) (.10) (.09) (.07)
36 months Males 5 .300 .400 7 .536 .429
(.12) (.10) (.10) (.08)
Females 10 .575 8 .687***
(.08) (.07) (.09) (.08)
Means .431 .543 .474 .555
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors.
* = significantly above chance atp < .05
** = significantly above chance at/? < .01
*** = significantly above chance atp< .001
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Table 3.
Proportion of Correct Responses on Trial 1 as a Function of
Type of Trial, Type of Response, and Age
^ Tool Selection Toollmplementation
Test Memory Test Memory
30 months
.38
.66
.38
.66
36 months .43
.72
.67
.69
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Figure 1
.
Layout of a Room and Model Used in the Standard DeLoache Task
Note. S = shelves, WB = wicker basket, C = chair, FP = floor pillow, D = dresser
From DeLoache, Kolstad, & Anderson, 1991.
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Figure 2 Sketch and Dimensions of the Child-Sized Workbench
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igure 3. The Interaction of Type of Trial, Age, and Condition
On Tool Selection
Location
Activity
Test Memory
Type of Trial
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Figure 4. The Interaction of Sex and Condition on Tool Implementation
Location
Condition
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Figure 5. Tool Selection on Memory Trials Collapsing Across Age,
Sex, and Condition
Trial Number
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Figure 6. Children's Tool Selection on Memory Trials
Collapsing Across Sex and Condition
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